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This essay contributes to the currently limited academic scholarship on Penelope Fitzgerald’s 
fiction by exploring affective interpersonal relationships as central themes in her novels In-
nocence (1986) and The Beginning of Spring (1988). I draw on Martha C. Nussbaum’s philo-
sophical work, in particular her recent publication Anger and Forgiveness (2016), to shed light 
on the arresting and unconventional ways in which Fitzgerald’s fiction dramatizes and often 
subverts commonly held notions of innocence, anger, guilt and forgiveness. This essay argues 
that Fitzgerald’s art as a novelist is particularly evident in the subtle and ironic manner in which 
she presents arresting moral insights. Nussbaum’s philosophical explorations of moral knowl-
edge provide the theoretical framework that clarifies these innovative and thought-provoking 
aspects of Fitzgerald’s work.
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Penelope Fitzgerald; affect; Martha Nussbaum; moral philosophy; contemporary literature
The British author Penelope Fitzgerald (1916–2000) is an outstanding but little-
known novelist. In the first part of her career she wrote a number of highly ac-
claimed biographies and achieved a substantial production of reviews and essays, 
earning the reputation of an astute literary critic with an extensive knowledge of 
art. In fiction, she was a late starter. Her first novel, The Golden Child, appeared 
in 1977, when she was sixty. Her prose fiction was well received by literary critics 
and authors, who recognized the unique quality of her novels. Among the authors 
who have lauded her work are Teju Cole, Julian Barnes, Penelope Lively, Frank 
Kermode, Alan Hollinghurst, Simon Callow, Andrew Miller and Anita Brookner. 
Perhaps most generous in praising Fitzgerald’s achievement has been A.S. Byatt, 
who deems her novels “works of art, in excellent prose … funny and terrible” and 
assigns the word “genius” to her, which, as she adds, “isn’t a word I much use” 
(2008: ix, x). Fitzgerald received many literary prizes, among which the Booker 
Prize for Offshore in 1979, and the American Book Critics’ Award in 1998 for The 
Blue Flower, when fellow competitors were Philip Roth’s American Pastoral and 
Don DeLillo’s Underworld. In 1996 she was awarded Britain’s Heywood Hall Prize 
for a lifetime’s achievement in literature. 
Despite the high regard of prominent writers and literary juries that has come 
Fitzgerald’s way, and notwithstanding the literary, cultural and philosophical com-
plexity of Fitzgerald’s fiction, academic interest in her work has been surprisingly 
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limited. Fitzgerald is not generally included in overview works on contemporary 
writers in English.1 The fact that Fitzgerald does get a place in Contemporary Brit-
ish Women Writers (1993) rather confirms the point, because the purpose of this 
collection of essays is precisely to bring to the fore lesser-known female authors 
who deserve to gain a wider readership. There are very few in-depth discussions 
of Fitzgerald’s work. The first book-length publication, Peter Wolfe’s Understand-
ing Penelope Fitzgerald (2004) is primarily introductory, presenting an overview of 
her novels that is targeted at students and non-specialist readers. Since 2007 only 
one more monograph has arrived on the scene, Christopher J. Knight’s Penelope 
Fitzgerald and the Consolation of Fiction (2017). Knight regretfully notes the fact 
that serious scholarly attention to Fitzgerald’s work has been inexplicably scarce 
despite its positive reception, and states that that it deserves better.2 In short, 
then, not only the paucity but also the disappointing quality of academic interest 
in Fitzgerald’s work is in evidence.
While it is difficult to account for the academic neglect of Fitzgerald’s work, it 
is also difficult to define the nature of her art as a novelist. A.S. Byatt’s summation 
of her authorship is perhaps most astute in this respect: “She writes very English 
versions of European metaphysical fables, embodying them in idiosyncratic real-
ity”; she is “an austere, original talent, unlike anyone else writing in this country 
at this time” (2008: x, xiii). It is indeed no exaggeration to say that Fitzgerald’s 
fiction inhabits a category of its own. Replete with much accurate factual histori-
cal detail, her work belongs firmly in the tradition of realism, but it also evokes 
a sense of mystery, calling into play the unseen forces in human life. Fitzgerald 
“describes experience that eludes intellectual systems,” as Wolfe states (2004: 7). 
Critics have made several attempts to classify Fitzgerald, comparing her to Jane 
Austen, Virginia Woolf and Muriel Spark, but such attempted categorization in-
evitably falls short of the mark; as Byatt observes, “Fitzgerald was Jane Austen’s 
nearest heir, for precision and invention. But she has other qualities, qualities 
I think of as European and metaphysical. She has what Henry James called ‘the 
imagination of disaster’” (1998: n.p.). If Fitzgerald’s novels do not belong to nov-
els of class or English manners, neither do they belong to the genre of historical 
fiction, despite their historical and cultural accuracy. The two novels discussed 
in this essay, Innocence (1986) and The Beginning of Spring (1988) offer a rich-
ness of historical details, but without drawing attention to Fitzgerald’s substantial 
background research, and creating a realistic setting in which extraordinary in-
terpersonal relationships develop. The term “historical novel” does not fit either 
novel; in his Preface to Innocence, Julian Barnes rejects the term as “misleading, 
diminishing” (2013: xii). Critics agree that Fitzgerald’s thorough research and her 
extensive knowledge are subservient to the more elusive dimensions of her art. 
Knight notes that this novel is amazing in its “an empathic reach and imaginative 
richness” (2017: 182). Each of her novels “takes a whole world of history, knowl-
edge, politics and literature and turns it into something at once suggestive and 
complete” (Byatt 2008: x). This transformative process, in which moral issues take 
a central place, is at the heart of the two novels selected for this essay. 
Innocence and The Beginning of Spring are generally counted among Fitzger-
ald’s best works and both were favorably received (Lee 2013: 323). Displaying 
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a plethora of historical details, both novels are set in times of political and social 
change. Innocence takes us to the Florence of 1955–1956, a time of emancipation, 
modernization and the onset of cultural change in Italy. The Beginning of Spring 
(hereafter cited as Spring) unfolds in 1913 Moscow before the outbreak of World 
War I and the Russian revolution; a year of social, political and familial upheav-
als. Both novels, then, are infused with the sense of impending change, and of 
a spirit of hope and optimism. While the historical and national circumstances of 
the narratives make fascinating reading, the central themes of the novels are not 
social and cultural changes, but human emotions and interactions, in particularly 
those related to innocence, anger, guilt, blame and forgiveness. 
To understand these central themes of Fitzgerald’s novelistic worlds it is useful 
to turn to insights that philosophy offers on affective and moral interpersonal 
relationships, as explained lucidly by philosopher and essayist Martha C. Nuss-
baum. Well known for her work on the relation between literature and moral 
philosophy, in particular since her collection of essays Love’s Knowledge (1990), 
Nussbaum’s fascination with the moral function of literature has often come to 
the fore in her publications and interviews. Her philosophical work often relies 
on literary examples, and she is interested in philosophically exploring fictional 
affective relationships taken from the works of Charles Dickens, Henry James, 
E. M. Forster and Richard Wright. Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness (2016) aids 
my discussion of anger and its related themes of revenge, guilt and forgiveness. 
In setting up this dialogue between Fitzgerald’s novels and Nussbaum’s philo-
sophical monograph my aim is to demonstrate not only the usefulness of the 
rational conceptualizations of moral philosophy to literary analysis, but in equal 
measure, the benefit that literary analysis of affective aspects, in all their diversity 
and specificity, may offer to philosophical conceptualization. This is in alignment 
with Nussbaum’s view that the answer to the profound question of “how one 
should live in the world” cannot be “fully and adequately stated in the language 
of conventional philosophical prose” but only in language and forms “more com-
plex, more allusive, more attentive to particulars” such as provided by major 
literary works (1990: 3). Literature may be philosophically important, Nussbaum 
states, in exploring “significant aspects of human moral experience” (1990: 138). 
Nussbaum is not alone in stating this importance. Moral philosopher Hilary Put-
nam likewise argues that literature aids us in the imaginative re-creation of moral 
complexities by presenting alternative views of ethical problems, aiding “the sen-
sitive appreciation in the imagination of predicaments and perplexities…essential 
to sensitive moral reasoning”; his view is that novels “frequently do something for 
us that must be done for us if we are to gain moral knowledge” (1978: 87, 86–87).3 
In Innocence and Spring Fitzgerald’s fictional explorations of moral knowledge ul-
timately address the time-honoured philosophical questions: What is innocence? 
Are anger and retribution necessary to justice? What is the good life? 
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Innocence
Fitzgerald’s novels Innocence and Spring, while very different in setting and plot, 
are similar in their subtle but profound explorations of vital human emotions 
and values. Major themes in both novels, already anticipated in their titles, are 
innocence and its fragility in human relationships; and renewal and forgiveness. 
The opening scenes in both novels already display the unconventional manner in 
which these themes are dramatized. The Beginning of Spring opens with an end-
ing: Frank Reid, the English owner of a printing press in Moscow, arrives home 
to find that his marriage is over: his wife Nellie has left him, taking their three 
young children with her to an unknown destination. Frank is confused and hurt 
but feels no anger, neither on first learning about his wife’s betrayal nor at any 
later stage--not even when he learns about her affair with his best friend. We 
never see Frank angry, indignant or harbouring vindictive thoughts towards Nel-
lie, although such emotions may well be considered the predictable or normal 
responses. Similarly, the very first pages of Innocence subvert conventional notions 
of innocence in presenting the family legend of the Ridolfis, an aristocratic family 
of midgets in Florence, 1568. Their daughter grows up surrounded by small peo-
ple, “confident that the world consisted of people less than 1.3 metres high” (5). 
This Contessina, eight years old, has a “compassionate heart,” and when her play-
mate Gemma, who is a dwarf, has a sudden spurt of growth she suggests kindly 
that Gemma’ legs be amputated at the knee and that her eyes be put out, to safe-
guard her continuing happiness as a little person and to keep her from knowing 
how different, indeed monstrous, she is.4 In the narrative present, some 400 years 
later, the Ridolfis are of ordinary size, but their special brand of well-intentioned 
yet dangerous innocence has remained. It seems odd that this characteristic has 
survived for so many years, the narrator’s voice drily comments, adding however 
that changes are at hand: “Perhaps it won’t do so for much longer” (10). When 
the later narrative shows that the trait remains unchanged, this comment, too, 
in retrospect may make us review our conventional responses; in this case, our 
responses to novelistic devices like this narrator’s commentary. Finding that “In-
nocence is her most complicated narrative,” Fitzgerald’s biographer Hermione 
Lee remarks that it continuously calls into question our expectations and thus 
“requires the reader’s close attention, as life should” (2013: 316, 317). In similar, 
yet different ways, Spring also invites us to ponder our habitual responses to 
narrative conventions as well as to received knowledge of affect and ethics in 
personal relationships. 
The absence of the common reactions of hurt pride, anger, or revenge thoughts 
in Frank’s response to Nellie’s cruel act of abandonment may be understood as 
a form of innocence which does not focus on wrong-doing at all. In this sense in-
nocence is aligned with goodness, the moral quality that primarily seeks and sees 
the good for all beings. This quality defines Frank’s character. His innocence is 
such that he sees only the good in others; he fails to notice Nellie’s lack of interest 
in her children, her dissatisfaction and her restless nature, and, tellingly, that her 
favorite expression is “to get rid of” (161). Deeply attached to his family, Frank’s 
goodness evidently stands in the way of his understanding of Nellie’s lack of it; 
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“How could Nellie be safe and well without them, the four of them? He wrote to 
her by every morning post” (62). If Frank is the innocent victim of marital infidelity, 
it is precisely his innocence that has made him unaware of the impending break-
up of his marriage. His friend and employee Selwyn Crane tells him that he lacks 
imagination: “Now, you’re not an imaginative man, Frank. If you have a fault, it’s 
that you don’t grasp the importance of what is beyond sense or reason. And yet 
that is a world in itself” (202). Innocence, as Fitzgerald’s narrative here suggests, 
may be a protection against the negative emotions of anger, revenge and resent-
ment, but it may also be equivalent to a lack of insight, empathy, or imagination. 
In Innocence, the Ridolfi’s hereditary innocence may also be understood in this 
negative light, as lacking insight or empathy. While in the novel’s young protago-
nist Chiara Ridolfi that innocence is depicted as a positive feature, characterized 
by the absence of limiting and self-centred factors such as vanity, self-conscious-
ness and sexual inhibitions, it is at the same time also negatively portrayed, as 
lacking restraint. ‘Reckless’ is the word used to describe Chiara’s dealings with 
the world, whether in traffic, where she drives recklessly, or in her relationship 
with Salvatore Rossi, with whom she quarrels recklessly, despite her genuine love 
for him. As Byatt comments, “both Chiara and her Salvatore are dangerous to 
themselves and others in their innocence; both are also hopeful and lovable” 
(1998: n.p.). Fitzgerald suggests that innocence is not per se beneficial or felicitous 
in its effects. Chiara’s lack of restraint is part of her innocence, as much as are 
her open-mindedness and other-directedness. The precariousness of this fragile 
but reckless innocence and its potential to hurt function as central motifs in the 
novel, similar to the motif of Frank Reid’s lack of (justifiable) anger in the face of 
injustice, which is a sign of his inner goodness as much as a sign of his blindness 
to discord and disaffectedness. 
The notion of innocence as formulated by Nussbaum in Love’s Knowledge con-
forms to the notion of innocence as deriving from a lack, a negative: as not having 
“any knowledge of evil, either for doing or for seeing” (1990: 127). This is the 
innocence generally associated with childhood, and thus it is a temporary con-
dition, as in Nussbaum’s reference to “the lost innocence of childhood” (1990: 
149). Fitzgerald’s Innocence makes no reference, explicit or implicit, to innocence 
as the purity of unsullied childhood, nor is innocence dramatized as a temporary 
deficiency, in Nussbaum’s sense of the quality of not yet having knowledge or 
insight. Nonetheless the novel is imbued with innocence; we find it in verbal ex-
changes, descriptions of family relationships and quarrels, and even in the name 
of Chiara’s English convent school, Holy Innocents. This girls’ school intends “to 
provide for life a fixed basis of judgement” (82), that is to say, to cure its pupils 
of open-mindedness. Chiara’s open-mindedness, as part of her characteristic in-
nocence, is such that even the convent, we are told, failed to rob her of it since 
she persists in finding “defensible” many other perspectives, “the point of view 
of every living creature” (82). Innocence is here presented as deriving not from 
a lack of insight or knowledge, but from a sensitivity to human equality and unity; 
this sensitivity evidently is the affect that the convent school seeks to erase. Its 
name, derived from the biblical Massacre of the Innocents (Matthew 2: 16–18) 
invites an ironic reflection on its own erasure of innocence.
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Irony, I would argue, is a defining characteristic of Fitzgerald’s art as a novel-
ist, and it functions to accentuate the peculiar nature of innocence and anger in 
the two novels. Her irony is light-hearted; the closest it gets to satire or caricature 
is when she portrays the innocent chauvinism of English characters, revealed 
in unintentionally discriminatory remarks. For example, Chiara’s school friend 
Barney regards Chiara with what Fitzgerald presents as a typically English mix-
ture of superiority and sympathy, as being “unlucky enough to be a foreigner” 
(80). While Chiara is open-minded and unprejudiced (honouring the point of 
view of “every living creature”) Barney displays a narrowmindedness that may 
be deemed innocent, too, in its lack of knowledge of interpersonal affective rela-
tions. When Chiara is pregnant Barney reassures her that the birth won’t be any 
problem because “Italian women produce them just like rabbits” (283). This in-
sulting remark exemplifies what the novel presents as the dark side of innocence: 
well-intentioned but unreflecting or “reckless” acts or words that are potentially 
hurtful. Throughout, Fitzgerald’s light irony undercuts the negativity of this in-
sensitivity, creating sympathy and understanding for Chiara’s rashness as well as 
for Barney’s bumbling insults. Ironic wit, as an important aspect of Fitzgerald’s 
work, enables us, as readers, “to suspend judgment,” as Jean Sudrann remarks, 
and even, “simultaneously to applaud and to censure” (1993: 113). Indeed irony is 
a vital and pervasive feature of Fitzgerald’s style. As Barnes observes, despite the 
profundity of Fitzgerald’s themes, as readers we are not overburdened since “the 
real heart and purpose of her fiction are often camouflaged” (2013: viii). Much 
of this camouflage, I would suggest, derives from Fitzgerald’s use of irony, which 
invites our sympathetic understanding of her characters and their misguided but 
often well-intentioned, innocent thoughts and actions. 
Nussbaum’s discussion of innocence in her reading of Maggie’s character in 
Henry James’ The Golden Bowl is rather more limited than Fitzgerald’s fictional 
representation in Innocence. Nussbaum primarily draws on the conventional no-
tion of innocence as belonging to immaturity and inexperience, as for instance 
in the freshness and purity of children or young women. This innocence rests on 
a moral purity that is due to a lack of life experiences, and therefore only tem-
porary; what follows inevitably is maturity, and guilt (1990: 357). In posing this, 
Nussbaum draws into play the archetypal fall from grace and the notion of Eden-
ic, hence universal, loss of innocence. In that discourse, innocence is spoken of 
as the condition of not (yet) having eaten from the tree of the knowledge of good 
and evil. In her literary analysis of James’ character, Nussbaum acknowledges that 
Maggie, while innocent and pure, may be aware of evil, stating however also that 
she refuses “knowledge of some truth,” which implies that Maggie deliberately 
chooses to be ignorant. Maggie’s innocence, as a deliberate blindness to her own 
capacity to work evil, allows the interpretation that she is too self-involved, too 
prone to self-justification to be entirely innocent, but Nussbaum does not draw 
that conclusion. She sees Maggie’s innocence, expressed in her “intention of nev-
er doing a wrong, never breaking a rule, never hurting” as a sign of her superior 
moral conscience, which “shrinks from the guilt of rendered pain” (1990: 126). 
While Nussbaum does not question Maggie’s youthful innocence, she notes also 
that we cannot ascribe an Edenic innocence to Maggie since “Adam’s daughter 
Irene Visser
267
was not born in Eden” and thus, that in all later people (including Maggie) there 
must be “some connection with original sin” (1990: 127, italics in the original). 
This comment nevertheless leaves unchanged Nussbaum’s affirmation of conven-
tional notions of innocence as moral purity. By contrast, Fitzgerald depicts an 
innocence that is of an entirely different nature, and perhaps not even morally 
outstanding. She suggests that the truly innocent, such as the Ridolfis, are not 
troubled by “the guilt of rendered pain” (as Maggie is) because guilt is not part 
of their mentality. While Chiara’s innocence resembles Maggie’s conventional 
innocence in its fresh and expectant openness to life’s experiences, Chiara truly 
sees no evil, and while she is reckless and passionate, arguing vehemently with 
Salvatore, she has no thought about guilt or blame. In the Ridolfi mindset, then, 
there is none of Maggie’s self-justification that is so close to hypocrisy.5 The moral 
knowledge offered by Fitzgerald in this novel is arresting; it asks us as readers to 
examine our own convictions against the narrative’s guiding notions: the truly 
blameless do not blame, and the truly innocent do not envisage evil.
What we may conclude at this point is that Nussbaum’s literary reading of 
innocence in Love’s Knowledge proceeds from conventional conceptions whereas 
in Fitzgerald’s Innocence those conceptions are subtly interrogated and often sub-
verted. Barnes observes that while the word “innocent” is normally paired with 
“victim,” in Innocence it is not passive, nor is it a noble virtue, but a “way of 
dealing with the world” (2013: ix). Innocence, in the Ridolfi’s dealing with the 
world, is indeed not passive, as I have shown, nor is it Edenic, doomed to be cor-
rupted. Its strength is its blindness to wrongdoing; its inability to envisage guilt 
and blame. Innocence thus precludes impulses related to destructive affective 
states such as anger, hatred and revenge. The instances inviting our understand-
ing of this moral knowledge are the main moments in Innocence, I would suggest, 
rather than, for instance, the comedic plot moments of young characters finding 
romantic love, although certainly the novel has much to offer along these lines. 
However, the several weddings that take place are not the crucial or final episodes 
of the novel; more significant are the scenes that invite us to ponder the novel’s 
alternatives to conventional notions of interpersonal affect and moral behaviour. 
Anger
While Fitzgerald’s arresting portrayal of innocence complements Nussbaum’s 
more conventional discussion of innocence, Fitzgerald’s fictional rendering of 
anger is illuminated and complemented by Nussbaum’s detailed study of anger in 
Anger and Forgiveness. Nussbaum’s central observation in this study is that in con-
temporary culture anger is generally accepted as morally justified and necessary, 
whereas the pursuit of non-anger, which she personally advocates, is not regarded 
with as much goodwill. In fact, the contemporary consensus is that anger is more 
acceptable than non-anger: anger is believed to be hardwired in human nature 
and to pursue non-anger would entail “an unhuman, extreme, and unloving type 
of detachment”; the prevalent view, then, is that “anger is good, powerful, and 
manly,” and thus it is indulged or even encouraged in children, especially boys 
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(2016: 249). In Spring, the contemporary consensus that anger is “good, powerful 
and manly” is refuted, for Frank, while deeply hurt by his wife’s abandonment, 
exhibits no desire to blame, no resentment, and no anger or revenge thoughts. 
We may wonder whether Frank is emotionally deficient, weak, or unmanly, since 
he fails to exhibit any of the categorical models of human responses to wrongdo-
ing that we have internalized and that literature so often dramatizes. Presented to 
us as “quiet by nature, and undemonstrative” (2), Frank is never idiosyncratically 
detached or unemotional; on the contrary, he experiences profound emotions 
of pain and confusion and his love for his children is beyond question; we read 
that the thought that the children were gone “suffocated him” (4). In his business 
affairs and in dealing with the police, Frank is decisive, intelligent and strong; 
as such, he is a fictional refutation of the notion that anger is an attribute of the 
domain of the powerful and manly. 
 The notion of retributive anger as “good” and “manly,” entrenched in con-
temporary culture, is not very different from the prevalent notions about anger 
in philosophical literature, as Nussbaum explains, which include the following: 
anger at being wronged is necessary for the preservation of self-respect and dig-
nity; anger at wrongdoing against others is essential as a sign that the wrong is 
a serious matter; and anger is thus essential to combatting injustice (2016: 6). To 
these dominant notions Fitzgerald presents oppositions and contrastive nuances. 
Innocence deliberately directs our attention to Frank’s non-anger by augmenting 
the incitements to anger that confront him. The day after the break-up of his 
family, Frank gets news that Nelly boarded the train alone, leaving their three 
young children unattended at the railway station. This abandonment is surely 
cruel and outrageous, raising further expectations of anger and revenge in re-
sponse, but Frank’s reaction is again to refrain from anger: finding that Nellie 
did not even leave a message to him by the children, “not a word”, he “saw that 
is would be best not to think about this, or he might not be able to stand it” (21). 
Dissociation from anger characterizes Frank’s attitude; we see no hint of any of 
the conventional notions of justified anger as categorized by Nussbaum, such 
as anger to maintain self-respect or to reveal the injustice of wrongdoing. What 
comes to the fore then is the moral insight that anger is not needed to call atten-
tion to injustice, since the unjust act itself is sufficient evidence of wrong-doing. 
This significant humane and moral knowledge is suggested rather than put in so 
many words. Fitzgerald’s art as a novelist is to enable an engagement with central 
emotional and moral issues reaching beyond the concrete and the actual without 
hammering the message home.6 
Nussbaum’s personal view is distinct from the conventional view of anger, 
and it is firmly supportive of Frank’s resignation and non-anger as dramatized in 
Spring. She points out that in personal relations anger is not a respectable asser-
tion of self-esteem but in fact deeply threatens the values “distinctive to personal 
intimacy” (2016: 7). However, Nussbaum also grants some positive side to anger: 
“Anger may still have some limited usefulness as a signal to self and / or others 
that wrongdoing has taken place, as a source of motivations to address it, and as 
a deterrent to others, discouraging their aggression” (2016: 6, italics in the origi-
nal). This limited usefulness, she adds, is however still no justification of anger; it 
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does not remove or detract from anger’s normative ugliness. Even with the reser-
vations made for anger’s deterrent or signaling effect, then, Nussbaum’s personal 
position remains oppositional to the notion of justifiable anger, in alignment with 
Frank Reid’s position in Fitzgerald’s novel.7
Nussbaum reserves a special place for what she terms Transition-Anger, which 
is anger on behalf of others, “whose entire content is: ‘How outrageous. Some-
thing should be done about that’” (2016: 6). This concept of Transition-Anger 
aids our understanding of Frank Reid in Spring. Fitzgerald in fact dramatizes this 
other-directed anger in the scene in which Selwyn Crane finally admits to Frank 
that he and Nellie were to run away to England together, but that at the station 
he had had second thoughts, also because of the presence of the three children, 
and had merely watched Nellie leave from a distance. It is revealed here that the 
saintly Selwyn, Frank’s friend, is a cheat, a coward, and a miser (since financial 
considerations also played a part). Surprisingly, Frank does not get angry on his 
own account as a cuckolded husband and distraught father, but displays strong 
feelings only on Nellie’s behalf: “Poor little Nellie, ditched…and you flaming well 
never turned up…I’ve put up with a lot this Easter, but I’m damned if I see why 
Nellie should have to” (238). As Nussbaum observes, Transition-Anger is uncom-
mon in its pure form since usually it is tainted with the wish for payback. This 
wish is entirely lacking in Frank’s emotional outburst, which thus is a pure form 
of transition-anger, commended by Nussbaum as morally superior behaviour: it is 
“promising” if anger “goes away in the Transition,” she states, because “one stops 
thinking about one’s own inner states and starts thinking about how to do some-
thing useful, and perhaps even generous, for others” (2016: 136). Clearly, here 
fiction illuminates what philosophy holds out as an ideal: Frank’s self-respect does 
not depend on retributive anger but on carrying out the tasks of a single father 
well; his energy is spent on managing his printing business responsibly, and on 
making sure that his children get proper care.
What we have seen so far is that in Fitzgerald’s novel Spring the conventional 
expectations of innocence and anger as categorized by Nussbaum are evoked, 
and then subverted in ways that are surprising yet plausible, inviting our un-
derstanding of alternatives to entrenched notions. In Innocence, too, anger is 
presented to us in a shape that does not fit the mould of the commonly held con-
ceptions of anger and revenge. Here Fitzgerald depicts an unlikely, yet convinc-
ing combination of anger and innocence in the character of Salvatore Rossi, the 
thirty-year old neurologist who marries Chiara Ridolfi. While Frank Reid is slow 
to anger, Salvatore is his complete opposite: he is a living volcano about to erupt 
at any time over trivial matters -- “the least important incidents troubled him 
most” (90) -- and while Frank has a just cause for anger and revenge, Salvatore 
has none, all his agitation being caused by his own thinking. His mind conjures 
up frustrations and irritations, even when things are going well. Thus, on first 
meeting Chiara, Salvatore soon loses his composure–not by anything that hap-
pens or is being said, but due to his own fairly insignificant thoughts (on elegant 
clothing) which confuse and then irritate him: “He felt deeply irritated. He had 
an intimation that he was lost” (42). Salvatore’s anger, then, does not conform to 
the conventional notion of justified anger as a signal of wrongdoing, nor is it an 
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affirmation or protection of self-respect in response to injustice. Here Fitzgerald 
presents a person who is both profoundly innocent and constitutionally irate in 
a combination that is most unusual. Nussbaum’s concept of “status anger” sheds 
light on this apparently unlikely or implausible combination. 
Status anger, Nussbaum explains, typically belongs to adolescence, the period 
of liberation from dependence on parental guidance and control. This anger 
is benign because it is temporary; it is also inevitable, its purpose and function 
being to help the adolescent effectuate separation and independence “because 
the child, trying to be independent, naturally resents the very existence and com-
petence of the parent” (2016: 106). Salvatore’s innocence is akin to the lack of 
insight of the immature, who do not yet understand their own emotions and 
drives, let alone other people’s motivations, yet seek to be independent. By the 
same token, his anger is the resisting status anger of the adolescent: even at thirty 
years old, Salvatore still feels that his mother “had cut him off, by a kind of in-
stinctive encircling movement, from his independence” (249). A flashback section 
in the novel aids our understanding of Salvatore’s status anger. When his father 
takes him along on a visit to the old and terminally ill Antonio Gramsci in prison, 
Salvatore, at ten years old, realizes that his father’s hero-worship of the great so-
cialist thinker is misplaced. Feeling “older than his parent” the boy then vows to 
have no such political or ideological allegiances and resolves to distance himself 
from his family and become a doctor. As an adult, having made his way success-
fully into the world of academia and medical science, Salvatore keeps himself 
to himself, avoiding contact with this family and feeling disconnected from his 
Southern background, although never entirely liberated from it. Juvenile insecu-
rity underlies his constant sense of frustration and irritation, debarring him from 
a more mature perspective. Like many an adolescent, Salvatore likes to construct 
an unrealistic, ideal image of himself: “Dr Rossi pure and simple, self-created, 
self-determined, forewarned and unclassifiable” (66), whilst at other times keenly 
exhibiting his basic insecurity and immaturity, as when he implores his friend and 
colleague Gentilini to help him despite his irascibility: “Think of me as a cripple, 
if you like, don’t turn away from me, take my hand” (74). After one of Salvatore’s 
outbursts Giulia, Gentilini’s wife, pinpoints the cause of his anger: he is “so un-
sure of himself, the poor man” (74). This compassionate response, as well as the 
flashback section help foster a sense of understanding. Similar to what we might 
feel for young people seeking to navigate the torrential time of adolescence, Sal-
vatore’s mental turmoil invites sympathy; for instance, as when he shouts after 
Chiara, “‘Come back! I’m saying what I don’t mean!” (102). 
It seems a contradiction in his characterization that Salvatore is never angry or 
irritated in his professional capacity. To his patients he is predictably reliable and 
kind, deemed by many a brilliant consultant (77); and credited with “serene will-
power” (95). This apparent contradiction is elucidated by Nussbaum’s concept 
of the middle realm, “the realm of the multitude of daily transactions we have 
with people that are not our close friends” (2016: 7). In his professional realm, 
where Salvatore is respected and confident, there is no interference of status 
anger. In this realm, Nussbaum states, anger is never beneficial, and in this sense 
it is different from the other realms in Nussbaum’s theorizing, in which she does 
Irene Visser
271
identify some positive aspects, such as the signaling or self-protective aspects of 
anger. Nussbaum’s middle realm sheds light on what seems a contradiction in 
Salvatore’s character, showing us the plausibility of Salvatore’s equanimity and 
even serenity in his daily dealings with his patients. 
Guilt and Blame
What the dialogic conversation between the work of Fitzgerald and Nussbaum 
set up in this essay has shown so far is that fiction may expand philosophical no-
tions in surprising ways, while philosophy aids literary interpretation by provid-
ing illuminating theoretical concepts of affective states. In the exploration of guilt 
and blame in Fitzgerald’s novels, this dialogue is similarly fruitful. In Innocence, 
as previously stated, the Ridolfis have no feelings of guilt despite the havoc they 
wreak in their altruistic innocence, and assigning blame is foreign to them. This 
is as unusual as, for instance, Salvatore’s particular combination of innocence 
and anger. Reviewers and critics have commented on the unconventional, even 
unsettling reading experience that Innocence offers. Jan Morris, for instance, has 
stated: “For the life of me I can’t decide how properly to respond to this book,” 
whilst also proclaiming it “one of the most skillful and utterly fascinating novels 
I have read for years” (Morris qtd. in Knight 2017: 199, 203); and C.K. Stead, in 
the London Review of Books, has remarked that Innocence “is a book that never 
seems to settle back … into a conventional exercise” (Stead qtd. in Lee 2013: 323). 
Fitzgerald’s representations of guilt and blame are similarly unconventional, be-
speaking a dimension of human affective relationships in which compassion and 
friendship override the more antagonistic human emotions. 
While very few characters in Fitzgerald’s novels exhibit even the slightest 
awareness of guilt or blame, Salvatore invites our scrutiny, since guilt dominates 
his thinking. His sense of wrong-doing has no concrete cause or justification, but 
it is deep-seated and crippling. For instance, he immediately feels guilty when 
Sannazarro, his father’s friend, tells him that as an intellectual he has a duty to 
return to the countryside, as Gramsci taught (176–177). Reproached, Salvatore 
“saw himself being driven into a corner, without hope of defence, as a good 
son…found guilty again, before a court he had never been asked to recognize” 
(176–177).8 Evidently, Salvatore’s guilt is closely related to his childhood, and 
what is alluded to here is his decision in the episode in the prison, at age ten, to 
go his own way rather than follow his father’s example. If we understand guilt as 
the acknowledgement of one’s actual wrong-doing, Salvatore’s feelings of guilt 
are clearly ill-founded, and may seem excessive and destructive. Nussbaum’s dis-
cussion of guilt as a notion in moral philosophy, however, sheds a fresh light on 
guilt. Guilt may be defined as a self-directed emotion, deriving from an awareness 
of one’s inadequacy or shortcomings, but without actual or concrete wrong-doing 
involved, exactly as shown by Salvatore. Seen in this light, guilt is not a negative 
quality, as Nussbaum explains, but in fact can be an important part of the moral 
life since an “auspicious” or “promising aspect of guilt” is that it typically focuses 
on damage to relationships with others, which is a remediable aspect of our 
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conduct (2016: 128). Guilt becomes destructive, Nussbaum adds, when the wish 
for payback ensues, because this leads to further self-incriminating: “A lot of 
anger at self, however, is accompanied by self-inflicted pain, which is a type of 
payback” (2016: 128). This remark illuminates Salvatore’s irrational behaviour 
and near-suicide in the climactic final episode of Innocence. 
It is another instance of Fitzgerald’s use of irony that Salvatore’s deep despair 
is caused by a characteristically innocent act by one of the Ridolfis. Maddalena 
Ridolfi, wanting to do good, has bought Salvatore’s family land and has donated 
him the deeds anonymously, unaware that this kindness might be misconstrued, 
which is exactly what happens. In fact, it fuels Salvatore’s guilt and undermines 
his self-esteem as a lover and a husband, for he immediately assumes that Chiara 
is behind the scheme, and that she wants him to return to his family land and 
give up his life in Florence. Salvatore’s composure is entirely shattered; unable 
to wrestle sense out of his obsessive mixture of guilt, self-anger, and love, he is 
driven to envisage suicide, insisting that “she would be better off without me” 
(334). This phrase is reminiscent of the phrase used in the narrative of the Ridolfi 
family legend, in which Gemma is deemed “better off” if blinded and crippled. 
The legend is indeed a constant undertow in the dramatic unfolding of the novel, 
here linking Salvatore’s reckless impulse to shoot himself to the rash and danger-
ous innocence that is the hereditary Ridolfi trait.9 Nussbaum’s views on guilt are 
very apposite to the interpretation of Salvatore’s suicidal notions in this scene. 
Guilt may be attended by the thought that “things will be made right if I inflict 
suffering (on myself)”, she states, even though this “is highly irrational and un-
productive” (2016: 131). Clearly Salvatore is highly irrational in this scene (his 
frantic behaviour only accentuated by the calm composure of the overly rational 
Cesare), and his wish to end his life, due to his ever-present, obsessive sense of 
guilt and status anger, is surely unproductive. However, both Fitzgerald and Nuss-
baum, in their respective domains, represent guilt also as a possibly constructive, 
temporary state that may lead to a restored self-esteem and to renewed affective 
connections. Nussbaum’s view is that “guilt, although it may be excessive or mis-
placed … is on balance a strongly positive force” (2016: 129). In Innocence, Salva-
tore’s turmoil is ended by a timely telephone call from Chiara which ends the 
misunderstanding and re-establishes their loving relationship. Salvatore’s guilt, 
now assuaged, makes him receptive to Chiara’s forgiveness, and in fact enables 
him to move forward. 
A parallel between Fitzgerald and Nussbaum in this respect is that both pre-
sent the desire to express love and forgiveness in response to guilt as a most 
desirable human motivation. Nussbaum states unequivocally that “guilt is the 
wrong motive and positive love and compassion the right motives” (2016: 131). 
Fitzgerald’s novels fictionally express the same notion: Frank Reid’s house is open 
to Nellie on her return (which happens at the beginning of spring); Chiara’s love 
and forgiveness calm the storm of Salvatore’s guilt and self-anger; relationships 




Forgiveness is an important yet relatively unexplored phenomenon in philosophi-
cal studies as well in literary scholarship. In her discussion of forgiveness, Nuss-
baum begins by stating that theorizing on forgiveness is underrepresented in 
the field of moral philosophy; moreover, “the concept of forgiveness is strikingly 
absent … (I would say) from all of ancient Greek ethics” (2016: 9). The same can 
be said about literary studies: Marian Eide’s study on forgiveness in the liter-
ary field reports only one pioneering monograph, authored by Julie McGonegal 
and published in 2009 (2010: 10).10 Author Jeanette Winterson has emphasized 
the importance of forgiveness in literature in several of her books. In The Gap 
of Time, which is her novelistic rendition of Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale, she 
observes that aside from the “happy ever after ending” there are only three possi-
ble endings to a story: revenge, tragedy and forgiveness (2015: 285). Shakespeare 
“who knew all about revenge and tragedy,” as she remarks, became interested 
in forgiveness late in his working life. He then dramatized the deeper truth that 
forgiveness signifies that the past can be redeemed (2015: 288). Forgiveness is 
liberating, Winterson argues. It offers “a chance of freedom from limits” as a sign 
that the past does not conclusively mortgage the future, and as such it is not only 
a crucially important aspect of literature but also of our personal lives (2015: 
288). In her autobiographical Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal? Winter-
son again states that there are only three kinds of what she terms “big endings” 
in literature: “Revenge, Tragedy, Forgiveness. Revenge and Tragedy often happen 
together. Forgiveness redeems the past. Forgiveness unblocks the future” (2011: 
225). In both of Fitzgerald’s novels discussed here forgiveness is a strong un-
dertow in the narrative plot movements, infusing dramatic moments, but rarely 
foregrounded. In Spring forgiveness comes to the fore explicitly only once, in the 
context of the Russian Easter rituals. On the eve of Palm Sunday Frank’s servants 
prepare for the Easter confession by going round the house and the neighbor-
hood asking forgiveness for sins committed knowingly or unknowingly (203). 
When Lisa asks Frank for forgiveness “for actions, for words and for unspoken 
thoughts,” Frank at first does not accept the idea of her wrongdoing until she 
adds, “who can go through a single day without doing wrong?” Realizing that 
the ritual is meaningful, Frank then tells Lisa that he forgives her (203). What 
Fitzgerald here foregrounds is the function of ritual, which, as Alexander states, 
is to attach people to each other, to increase identification, and to intensify the 
social connections between participants (2004: 25). Eide, in her study on forgive-
ness, observes that forgiveness needs ritual, “predictable rites,” to be meaningful 
(2010: 1). Fitzgerald’s exchange between Frank and Lisa further suggests that an 
open-minded receptiveness on the side of both participants is necessary for the 
ritual to be meaningful. This is an insight that Frank acquires, and as such also 
a further instance of the moral knowledge offered in this novel. 
In the area of forgiveness, Nussbaum claims, religion has more to offer than 
philosophy, since “both Jewish and Christian texts contain alternatives to trans-
actional forgiveness, in which generosity, love and even humor replace the grim 
drama of penance and exacted contrition” (2016: 11). While there are references 
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to religion in all of Fitzgerald’s novels, and while in the novel Spring the con-
nection between forgiveness and Easter is evident, there is no overt message 
to the effect that religious dogma might make us more forgiving.11 Frank is not 
a churchgoing believer and on the one occasion when he thinks about religion 
it is in a vague way, concluding that “Perhaps I have faith even if I have no be-
liefs” (155). This characterization suggests that religious instruction may not be 
necessary for leading a good life. Frank forgives unconditionally, showing no 
urge to demand apologies from others, not even from Selwyn or Kuriatin (who 
endangered the lives of Frank’s children). This desire to extract apologies Nuss-
baum views as a form of humiliation, warning us that “we should beware of it” 
(2016: 13). Humiliation, in whatever guise, undermines reconciliation. Nussbaum 
argues that “the whole drama of anger and forgiveness” can be left behind by 
forging attitudes that support reconciliation and trust; those attitudes are “gen-
erosity, justice, and truth” (2016: 13). Frank is the fictional embodiment of these 
moral qualities in an ordinary person’s life; as such, we may take him as an invi-
tation to ponder the benign, everyday effects of the attitudes that support con-
nectedness and trust. 
The most commonly held concept of forgiveness as described by Nussbaum is 
“transactional forgiveness”: a state of mind reached after initial anger, followed 
by confrontation, apology, and/or confession until the wronged person “emerges 
triumphant, unburdened from angry emotion, her claims fully acknowledged, 
ready to bestow the grace of her non-anger” (2016: 10). Although it is the preva-
lent notion in Western culture, transactional forgiveness, as Nussbaum empha-
sizes, is not a moral virtue, nor is it an antidote to anger; it is akin to “the score-
keeping mentality of anger’s payback wish” (2016: 11). In both Innocence and 
Spring, forgiveness is of an entirely different nature than the prevalent view as 
formulated by Nussbaum, since no confessions or apologies are exacted; on the 
contrary, in these novels forgiveness is extended unconditionally. In the final 
pages, the narrative movement of both novels is towards togetherness and recon-
ciliation, without any hint of retributive demands. Fitzgerald’s forgiveness, then, 
is very unlike the transactional forgiveness that Nussbaum ironically calls the 
“canonical form of forgiveness in today’s world” (2016: 10). 
In her meditation on forgiveness Winterson suggests that in fiction we are used 
to reading about hurt, revenge, and all sorts of passive or active acts of aggression, 
and that forgiveness usually appears in “highly dramatic moments of forgiveness 
and reconciliation” (2015: 285-288). In Fitzgerald’s fiction forgiveness is enacted 
with subtlety and restraint rather than in highly dramatic moments, but her novels 
are nevertheless conducive to stimulating our thinking about forgiveness; as for 
instance, when Salvatore’s moral sensitivity is revealed in his thought about Chi-
ara that “[h]owever much they disagreed there would surely never be anything to 
forgive” (250). The Ridolfis, harbouring no thoughts of guilt or blame, convey the 
moral knowledge that innocence has no need of forgiveness. In their respective 
modes, then, both Nussbaum and Fitzgerald convey similar notions of the impor-
tance of non-retributive forgiveness: it is the voluntary relinquishment of payback 
thoughts; the generous offering of acquittal from debts, and thus, in Winterson’s 




This essay has attempted to demonstrate that philosophy may offer a fruitful con-
ceptual basis for literary analysis while literature offers details of relational and 
interpersonal dynamics that may expand or even subvert philosophical concepts. 
In the dialogue between Nussbaum’s philosophical concepts and Fitzgerald’s 
novels, it becomes clear that Fitzgerald’s work upends our internalized categori-
cal models of the affective states relating to innocence, anger, guilt and forgive-
ness. Her novels break our conceptual moulds; they offer an invitation to ponder 
moral knowledge and open up ways of seeing that may help us make our concep-
tualizing less narrowly conventional and more spacious and inclusive. Consider-
ing Fitzgerald’s art as a novelist, Barnes remarks that “writers, over the long run, 
are judged by the truths they detect about the human condition, and the artistry 
with which they represent those truths” (2013: xv). It is indeed Fitzgerald’s ac-
complishment as an author to combine elegance of style, detailed and authentic 
historic settings and realistic human relationships with a strong yet unobtrusive 
presence of what she herself formulated, in her 1997 review of Muriel Spark’s 
Reality and Dreams, as “the vast unseen presences on which our lives are depend-
ent or contingent” (Fitzgerald qtd. in Wolfe 2004: 46). It may be this latter quality 
that makes her fiction difficult to categorize generically, and which makes it less 
accessible to superficial reading. As such, it may well account for the discrepancy 
between her work’s high critical esteem and its lack of popularity among a wider 
audience. What can be accounted for conclusively, however, is that Fitzgerald’s 
dramatization of interpersonal affective states are central to her art as a novelist, 
as is her unostentatious but arresting method of undermining conventional no-
tions of moral categories such as innocence and forgiveness, as I have argued in 
this essay. In this sense, Fitzgerald’s work is both academically and philosophically 
interesting. This essay then hopes not only to stimulate further academic work 
on Fitzgerald’s oeuvre, but also to contribute to the area in which literature and 
philosophy meet in mutually enriching ways. 
Notes
1 A random sampling of titles published since 2000 supports this. The survey included: 
Cambridge Companion to the Contemporary Short Story (2016); Postmodern Literature 
(2016); British Fiction Since 1945 (2015); The Contemporary British Novel Since 2000 
(2005); Contemporary British Fiction (2008 and 2017 editions); The Value of the Novel 
(2015); and Imagination and the Contemporary Novel (2011). None include Penelope 
Fitzgerald. 
2 Knight is particularly dismissive of Wolfe’s monograph, stating that it is “’too 
impressionistic” and that “Wolfe is especially fond of large, unevidenced 
generalizations of pseudo-psychological or biographical character” (2017: 34).
3 I refer to Putnam’s Meaning and the Moral Sciences, published in 1978, which has since 
been reissued in 2013 as part of the Routledge Revival series.
4 This legend dates from 1560 Florence. In Fitzgerald’s So I Have Thought of You, 
Terence Dooley states that she was told this “cruel legend or parable” by a friend 
whilst she was staying in Italy (2008: xxxiii).
Brno Studies in English 2020, 46 (1)
276
5 This is demonstrated also when the legend of the maiming of the dwarf Gemma is 
eventually changed by the Tourist Authority to end in Gemma’s escape, making it 
more palatable to the public. This change is deemed unnecessary by the Ridolfis.
6 Lee recounts that in a radio interview Fitzgerald told her “that her books were so 
short because she didn’t like to tell her readers too much: she felt it insulted them to 
overexplain” (2005: 158). 
7 In Nussbaum’s Conclusion, she addresses her readers directly, hoping to get them to 
see clearly “the irrationality and stupidity of anger”; “the stupidity of the retributive 
spirit”; and “irrational retributivism” as “childish and undisciplined behavior” (2016: 
249). 
8 In Sannazzaro Fitzgerald depicts idealism bordering on fanaticism. Sannazzaro, 
presented as “one of those not born to succeed, with the short-sighted mildness of 
a certain kind of violent revolutionary” resembles Selwyn Crane in Spring, another 
revolutionary, even in the way in which the police (Italian and Russian respectively) 
regard both of them as harmless idealists (Innocence 171; Spring 46). Fitzgerald knew 
and admired the works of both Gramsci and Tolstoy (Dooley 2008: xxxv), but her 
admiration did not translate into intellectually and morally outstanding fictional 
characters, for Sannazzaro and Selwyn, followers of Gramsci and Tolstoy respectively, 
hurt and manipulate others.
9 The felicitous ending to Salvatore’s suicidal thoughts prompts the notion that 
Gemma’s eyes and legs, too, may have been spared. The legend itself leaves Gemma’s 
fate undecided.
10 Eide refers to McGonegal’s book Imagining Justice: The Politics of Postcolonial Forgiveness 
and Reconciliation. McGill-Queen’s UP, 2009.
11 Although Fitzgerald was a church-going person all her life, her religiosity is not 
evident from her fiction. It seems necessary to point this out, since religion was 
a formative factor in her life and career. Both Fitzgerald’s grandfathers were bishops 
(of Lincoln and Manchester), and her extensive personal knowledge of religious and 
clerical matters is evident from her non-fiction, in particular from her biography The 
Knox Brothers (1977). In chronicling the lives of her father and his three brothers, this 
biography is equally sympathetic in describing the deep-felt religious convictions of 
her uncles Wilfred and Ronald Knox and the equally deep-felt atheism of her uncle 
Alfred Dillwyn Knox. Fitzgerald never discloses her personal views in this biography, 
and in fact refers to herself only a few times as “the niece.” In interviews, when 
almost inevitably the topic of her personal beliefs was raised, Fitzgerald would evade 
the question, or say that she was unable to express just what faith meant to her as 
a person and as an author. Her biographer Hermione Lee states that Fitzgerald’s 
“reticence was ingrained” (2013: 427). While it is relevant to know Fitzgerald’s family 
background, described by A. S. Byatt as a family “of bishops, saints, dons, idealists, 
intellects” (2008: xi), her novels are not religious in any didactic or moralistic sense. 
They do however invite our engagement with the Christian notions of forgiveness 
and non-anger, as I have shown. 
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